12.2: Hash-Then-MAC

In this section we’ll see a simple application of collision resistance. It is a common theme in cryptography, that instead of dealing with large data it is often sufficient to deal with only a hash of that data. This theme is true in particular in the context of MACs.

     One particularly simple way to construct a secure MAC is to use a PRF directly as a MAC. However, PRFs (and in particular, block ciphers) often have a short fixed input length, making them suitable only for MACs of such short messages. To extend such a MAC to longer inputs, it suffices to compute a MAC of the hash of the data. This idea is formalized in the following construction:

 

Construction 12.2: Hash-Then-MAC

Let M be a MAC scheme with message space ? = {0,1}ⁿ and let ℋ be a hash family with output length n. Then hash-then-MAC (HtM) refers to the following MAC scheme:

 

Claim 12.3

Construction 12.2 is a secure MAC, if ℋ is collision-resistant and M is a secure MAC.

 

Proof

We prove the security of HtM using a standard hybrid approach.

 

The starting point is ℒ^HtM_mac-real, shown here with the details of HtM filled in. Our goal is to eventually reach ℒ_mac-fake, where the VER subroutine returns false unless (m,t) was generated by the GETMAC subroutine.

 

We have applied the MAC security of M, omitting the usual details (factor out, swap libraries, inline). Now VER returns false unless (H(m),t) ∈ ?.

 

Here we have applied the security of the hash family ℋ. We have factored out all calls to H in terms of ℒ^ℋ_cr-real, replaced ℒ_cr-real with ℒ_cr-fake, and then inlined.

Now we have simply added another set ?’ which is never actually used. We point out two things: First, in GETMAC, (y,t) added to ? if and only if (H⁻¹ [y],t) is added to ?’. Second, if the last line of VER is reached, then the library has not self destructed. So H⁻¹ [y] = m, and in fact H⁻¹ [y] has never been defined to be anything else. This means the last line of VER is equivalent to:

(y,t) ∈ ? ⇔ (H⁻¹ [y],t) ∈ ?’ ⇔ (m,t) ∈ ?’

We have replaced the condition (H(m),t) ∈ ? with (m,t) ∈ ?’ . But we just argued that these statements are logically equivalent within the library

 

 

We remove the variable H⁻¹ and self destruct statements via a standard sequence of changes (i.e., factor out in terms of ℒ_cr-fake, replace with ℒ_cr-real, inline). We also remove the now-unused variable ?. The result is ℒ^HtM_mac-fake, as desired.

 

     The next-to-last hybrid is the key step where collision-resistance comes into our reasoning. Indeed, a collision would break down the argument. If the adversary manages to find a collision y = H(m) = H(m’), then it could be that (y,t) ∈ ? and (m,t) ∈ ?’ but (m’,t) ∉ ?. This corresponds to a forgery of HtM in a natural way: Ask for a MAC of m, which is t = MAC(k,H(m)); then t is also a valid MAC of m’.