6.6☆: Strong Pseudorandom Permutations
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Since a block cipher \(F\) has a corresponding inverse \(F^{-1}\), it is natural to think of \(F\) and \(F^{-1}\) as interchangeable in some sense. However, the PRP security definition only guarantees a security property for \(F\) and not its inverse. In the exercises, you will see that it is possible to construct \(F\) which is a secure PRP, whose inverse \(F^{-1}\) is not a secure PRP!
It would be very natural to ask for a PRP whose \(F\) and \(F^{-1}\) are both secure. We will later see applications where this property would be convenient. An even stronger requirement would allow the distinguisher to query both \(F\) and \(F^{-1}\) in a single interaction (rather than one security definition where the distinguisher queries only \(F\), and another definition where the distinguisher queries only \(F^{-1}\) ). If a PRP is indistinguishable from a random permutation under that setting, then we say it is a strong PRP (SPRP).
In the formal security definition, we provide the calling program \(t\) wo subroutines: one for forward queries and one for reverse queries. In \(\mathcal{L}_{\text {sprp-real }}\), these subroutines are implemented by calling the PRP or its inverse accordingly. In \(\mathcal{L}_{\text {sprp-rand, we emulate the }}\) behavior of a randomly chosen permutation that can be queried in both directions. We maintain two associative arrays \(T\) and \(T_{i n v}\) to hold the truth tables of these permutations, and sample their values on-demand. The only restriction is that \(T\) and \(T_{i n v}\) maintain consistency \(\left(T[x]=y\right.\) if and only if \(\left.T_{i n v}[y]=x\right)\). This also ensures that they always represent an invertible function. We use the same technique as before to ensure invertibility.
Let \(F:\{0,1\}^{\lambda} \times\{0,1\}^{\text {blen }} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\text {blen }}\) be a deterministic function. We say that \(F\) is a secure strong pseudorandom permutation \((\boldsymbol{S P R P})\) if \(\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{sprp}-\mathrm{real}}^{F} \approx \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{sprp}-\mathrm{rand}}^{F}\), where:
Earlier we showed that using a PRF as the round function in a 3-round Feistel cipher results in a secure PRP. However, that PRP is not a strong PRP. Even more surprisingly, adding an extra round to the Feistel cipher does make it a strong PRP! We present the following theorem without proof:
If \(F:\{0,1\}^{\lambda} \times\{0,1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\lambda}\) is a secure PRF, then the 4-round Feistel cipher \(\mathbb{F}_{4}\) (Construction 6.11) is a secure SPRP.


