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12: Authenticated Encryption and AEAD ☆

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    It can be helpful to think of encryption as providing a secure logical channel between two users who only have access to an insecure physical channel. Below are a few things that an attacker might do to the insecure physical channel:

    • An attacker may passively eavesdrop; i.e., simply observe the channel. A CPA-secure encryption scheme provides confidentiality and prevents the attacker from learning anything by eavesdropping.
    • An attacker may drop messages sent along the channel, resulting in a denial of service. If the attacker can do this on the underlying physical channel, then it cannot be overcome through cryptography.
    • An attacker may try to modify messages that are sent along the channel, by tampering with their ciphertexts. This sounds like what CCA-secure encryption protects against, right?
    • An attacker may try to inject new messages into the channel. If successful, Bob might receive a message and mistake it for something that Alice meant to send. Does CCA security protect against this? If it is indeed possible to inject new messages into the channel, then an attacker can delete Alice’s ciphertexts and replace them with their own. This would seem to fall under the category of "modifying" messages on the channel, so message-injection and message-modification are somewhat connected.
    • An attacker may try to replay messages that were sent. For example, if Bob was convinced that a ciphertext \(c\) came from Alice, then an attacker can re-send the same \(c\) many times, and Bob may interpret this as Alice wanting to re-send the same plaintext many times. Does CCA security protect against this?

    Although it might seem that CCA-secure encryption guarantees protection against many of these kinds of attacks, it does not!

    To see why, consider the SPRP-based encryption scheme of Construction 9.3. We proved that this scheme has CCA security. However, it never raises any errors during decryption. Every ciphertext is interpreted as a valid encryption of some plaintext. An attacker can choose an arbitrary ciphertext, and when Bob decrypts it he might think Alice was trying to send some (presumably garbled) message. The only thing that CCA security guarantees is that if an attacker is able to make a ciphertext that decrypts without error, then it must decrypt to something that is unrelated to the contents of other ciphertexts.

    In order to achieve protection against message-modification and message-injection on the secure channel, we need a stronger/better security definition. Authenticated encryption (AE) formalizes the extra property that only someone with the secret key can find ciphertexts that decrypt without error. For example, encrypt-then-MAC (Construction 10.9) already has this property.

    In this chapter we will discuss authenticated encryption and a closely-related concept of encryption with associated data (AD), which is designed to help prevent messagereplay attacks. These two concepts are the "gold standard" for encryption.

    This page titled 12: Authenticated Encryption and AEAD ☆ is shared under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Mike Rosulek (Open Oregon State) via source content that was edited to the style and standards of the LibreTexts platform; a detailed edit history is available upon request.

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